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Spread-spectrum watermarking is generally considered to be robust against collusion attacks, and thereby suitable for digital
fingerprinting. We have previously introduced the minority extreme attack (IWDW ’07), and showed that it is eﬀective against
orthogonal fingerprints. In this paper, we show that it is also eﬀective against random Gaussian fingerprint. Furthermore, we
develop new randomised attacks which counter the eﬀect of the decoder preprocessing of Zhao et al.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unauthorised copying is a major worry for many copyright
holders. As digital equipment enables perfect copies to be
created on amateur equipment, many are worried about lost
revenues, and steps are introduced to reduce the problem.
Technology to prevent copying has been along for a long
time, but it is often controversial because it not only prevents
unauthorised copying, but also a lot of the legal and fair use.
A diﬀerent approach to the problem is to deter potential
oﬀenders using technology to allow identification after the
crime. Thus, the crime is not prevented, but the guilty users
can be prosecuted. If penalties are suﬃciently high, potential
pirates are unlikely to accept the risk of being caught.
One such solution is digital fingerprinting, first proposed
by Wagner [1]. Each copy of the copyrighted file is marked
by hiding a fingerprint identifying the buyer. Illegal copies
can then be traced back to one of the legitimate copies and
the guilty user be identified. Obviously, the marking must
be made such that the user cannot remove the fingerprint
without ruining the file. Techniques to hide data in a file
in such a way are known as robust watermarking. All
references to watermarking (WM) in this paper refer to
robust watermarking.
A group of users can compare their individual copies
and observe diﬀerences caused by the diﬀerent fingerprints
embedded. By exploiting this information they can mount
so-called collusive attacks. There is a growing literature
on collusion-secure fingerprinting, both from mathematical
and abstract and from practical view-points.
In this paper, we focus on Gaussian, spread-spectrum
fingerprinting, where each user is identified by a random,
Gaussian signal which is added to the copyrighted file (host
signal). Our main purpose is to demonstrate that there are
collusion attacks which are more eﬀective than the ones
studied by Zhao et al. [2]. We make extensive experiments
to compare the various attacks. Our starting point is the
minority extreme attack introduced in [3] in a context of
non-Gaussian fingerprints.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We will introduce
our model for fingerprinting in general and spread spectrum
fingerprinting in particular in Section 2. We introduce our
new collusion attacks in Section 3, and consider noise attacks
in Section 4. In Section 5, we make a further evaluation,
testing the attacks under diﬀerent conditions. Finally, there
is a conclusion in Section 6.
2. FINGERPRINTING MODELS
There are several diﬀerent approaches to fingerprinting. It is
often viewed as a layered system. In the fingerprinting (FP)
layer, each user is identified by a codeword c, that is, an n-
tuple of symbols from a discrete q-ary alphabet. If there are
M codewords (users), we say that they form an (n,M)q code.
In the watermarking (WM) layer, the copyrighted file is
divided into n segments. When a codeword c is embedded,
each symbol of c is embedded independently in one segment.
The layered model allows independent solutions for each
layer. Coding for the FP layer is known as collusion-secure
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Table 1: Overview of notation used throughout.
Symbol Name
x Host signal (original, copyrighted file)
w(u) Watermark of user u
y(u) = x + w(u) Watermarked file distributed to user u
z Hybrid copy produced by the collusion
r = z− x Received watermark
r′ Received watermark after preprocessing
codes and was introduced in [4]. A number of competing
abstract models have been suggested, and mathematically
secure solutions exist for most of the models.
In principle, any robust watermarking scheme can be
used in the WM layer. However, there has been little research
into WM systems which supports the abstract models
assumed for the collusion-secure codes, thus it is not known
whether existing collusion-secure is applicable to a practical
system. Recent studies of this interface are found in [5, 6], but
they rely on experimental studies with few selected attacks,
and the mathematical model has not been validated.
In this paper, we will consider a simpler class of solutions,
exploiting some inherent collusion resistance in spread-
spectrum watermarking. We focus on the solution suggested
in [2].
2.1. Spread-spectrum fingerprinting
We view the copyrighted file as a signal x = (x1, . . . , xN ),
called the host signal, of real or floating-point values xi.
Each user u is identified by a watermark signal w(u) =
(w(u)1 , . . . ,w
(u)
N ) over the same domain as the host signal.
The encoder simply adds the two signals to produce a
watermarked copy y(u) = (y(u)1 , . . . , y(u)N ) for distribution.
A goal is to design the watermark w so that y and x
are perceptually as similar as possible. No perfect measure
is known to evaluate perceptual similarity. He and Wu [5]
use the peak signal-to-noise ration (PSNR). Zhao et al. [2]
consider the just noticeable diﬀerence (JND) as the smallest,
perceptible change which can be made to a single sample,
and they measure distortion as the mean square error (MSE)
ignoring samples with distortion less than some threshold
(called JND). This heuristic is called MSEJND.
In the system of [2], which we study, the watermark
signals w(u) are drawn independently at random from a
normal distribution with variance σ2 = 1/9 and mean μ = 0.
It is commonly argued that in most fingerprinting
applications, the original file will be known by the decoder,
so that nonblind detection can be used [2, 5]. Let z =
(z1, . . . , zN ) denote the received signal, such as an intercepted
unauthorised copy. Knowing x, the receiver can compute the
received watermark r = (r1, . . . , rN ) = z−x, which is the input
to the decoder.
The adversary, the copyright pirates in the case of
fingerprinting, will try to disable the watermark by creating
an attacked copy z which is perceptually equivalent to y, but
where the watermark cannot be correctly interpreted. In the
case of a collusion attack, there is a group of pirates each
possessing one watermarked copy yi.
An overview of the symbols introduced can be seen in
Table 1.
2.2. Fingerprint decoding




















The simplest decoding algorithm would return the user
solving maxu〈w(u), r〉. This is sometimes used, but more
often some kind of normalisation is recommended.
2.2.1. The general decoder
Following [2], we study three heuristics which assign a
numerical value h(r, w) to any pair of signals r and w.
Each heuristic h can be used either for list decoding or for
maximum heuristic decoding. The latter returns the user u
solving max h(r, w(u)). A list decoder would return all users
u such that h(r, w(u)) ≥ τ for some threshold τ.
The performance measure for a maximum heuristic
decoder is simply the error rate. Only one user is output,
who is either guilty (correct) or not (error). List decoder
performance cannot be described by a single parameter.
The output may be empty (false negative); it may include
innocent users (false positive); or it may be a nonempty set of
guilty users only (correct decoding). The trade-oﬀ between
false positive and false negative error rates is controlled by
the threshold τ.
One may also want to consider the number of guilty users
returned by the list decoder. If two decoders have identical
error rates, one would clearly prefer one which tends to
return two guilty users instead of just one.
It should be noted that a list decoder can never have
a higher probability of correct decoding than a maximum
heuristic decoder for the same heuristic. When the list
decoder decodes correctly, the user with the maximum
heuristic will clearly be in the output set and also be correctly
returned by the maximum heuristic decoder.
We will mainly consider the maximum heuristic decoder.
This does provide a bound on the performance of a list
decoder, and we avoid any potential controversies in the
choice of τ.
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2.2.2. Decoding heuristics
The so-called T statistic is simply normalised correlation,
defined as follows:
T(u) = 〈r, w
(u)〉
‖w(u)‖ . (4)
From the attacker’s point of view, this is the easiest heuristic
to analyse, as it is linear in each sample of r.
The most eﬀective heuristic according to the experiments




N − 3 log 1 + ρu
1− ρu , (5)
where
ρu = (1/N)〈r, w
(u)〉 − r w(u)
σ̂rσ̂w(u)
, (6)







(si − s)2. (7)
The final statistic is the q statistic, which is based on the
mean Mu and standard deviation Vu of the signal (riw
(u)
i |






Observe that Mu = 〈r, w(u)〉/N . Thus, all the three heuristics
are based on correlation.
2.2.3. Preprocessing
Zhao et al. [2] point out that the three decoding heuristics
presented have not been designed for collusion-resistance
in particular. In order to improve the performance, they
introduce a preprocessing step. The theoretical foundation is
not very clear in their paper, but it works well experimentally.
Our simulations have confirmed this.
They considered the histogram of the received watermark
r at the decoder for various attacks presented in Section 2.3.
The median, average, and midpoint attacks roughly
produce normal distribution with zero mean. The Min and
Max attacks give normal distributions with nonzero means
(negative and positive means, resp.). The RandNeg attacks
give a histogram with two peaks, one positive and one
negative. Very few samples are close to zero.
In the case of the single peak, the preprocessor subtracts
the mean, to return r′ = r − r. In the case of a double peak,
the samples are divided into two subsets, one for negative
values and one for positive ones. The mean is calculated and
subtracted independently for each subset.
Zhao et al. gave no definition of a peak in the histogram,
and no algorithm to identify them automatically. As long as
we are restricted to the known attacks, this is only a minor
problem. It is obvious from visual inspection which case we
are in.
We will, however, introduce attacks where it is not clear
which preprocessor mode to use. In these cases we will
test both modes, so Preproc(1) denotes the preprocessor
assuming two peaks, and Preproc(2) is the preprocessor
assuming a single peak.
2.3. Spread spectrum collusion attacks
The collusion attack is mounted by a collusion of pirates,
each of whom has a watermarked copy y(u) perceptually
equivalent to the (unknown) host x. The most commonly
studied attacks are functions working independently on
each sample i, that is, zi = A(y(u1)i , . . . , y(ut)i ), where P =
{y(u1), . . . , y(ut)} is the set of colluder watermarks.
Both randomised and deterministic attack functions A
have been studied. In principle, A could depend on the
entire signal, and not only on the samples corresponding
to the output sample, but this possibility has received little
attention in the literature. Our starting point is the following
range of attacks which were analysed in [2].





Minimum: zmini = min
y∈P
yi.
Maximum: zmaxi = max
y∈P
yi.
Median: zmedi = median
y∈P
yi.
Midpoint (MinMax): zmidi = (zmini + zmaxi )/2.
Modified negative: z
modneg








zmini with probability p,
zmaxi with probability 1− p,
(9)
It was assumed in [2], that p for the randomised negative
attack be independent of the signals {yi}.
The analysis of [2] demonstrated that the randomised
negative attack gave the highest error rate against decoders
without preprocessing. None of the attacks were eﬀective
against decoders with preprocessing for the parameters
studied. The average attack gives the lowest distortion of all
the attacks. This is obvious as it is known as a good estimate
for the original host x.
2.4. Collusion attacks and collusion-secure codes
It is instructive to consider attacks commonly considered
in the literature on collusion-secure codes. Recall that the
fingerprint w in the context of collusion-secure codes is not
a numerical signal, but rather a word (vector) over a discrete
alphabet Q. The basic operations of average, minimum, and
maximum are not defined on this alphabet.
The so-called marking assumption defines which attacks
are possible in the model. In the original scenario of [4],
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the pirates can produce an output symbol zi, if and only
if zi ∈ {y(u1)i , . . . , y(ut)i }. In a more realistic scenario [6, 7],
the pirates can produce a symbol zi /∈{y(u1)i , . . . , y(ut)i } with
probability p. However, with probability 1− p, we have zi ∈
{y(u1)i , . . . , y(ut)i }.
It is generally known that the so-called minority choice
attack is very eﬀective if correlation decoding (or, equiva-
lently, closest neighbour decoding) is used. In this attack the
output is the symbol zi ∈ {y(uj )i | j = 1, . . . , t} minimising
the number of colluders u with y(u)i = zi.
The rationale for this attack is straight forward. All the
colluders u with y(u)i = zi gets a positive contribution
to the correlation from sample i; all the other users get a
negative contribution. Hence, the minority choice minimises
the average correlation of the colluders.
The minority choice attack does not apply directly to
Gaussian fingerprints. With each watermark drawn ran-
domly from a continuous set, one would expect all the
samples y(u)i seen by the pirates to be distinct. However, we
will see that we can construct an eﬀective attack based on the
same idea.
2.5. Evaluation methodology
There are two important characteristics for the evaluation of
fingerprinting attacks.
Success rate: The attack succeeds when an error occurs
at the watermark decoder.
Distortion: The unauthorised copy has to pass in place
of the original, so it should be as close as possible to the
unknown signal x perceptually.
The success rate of the attack is the resulting error rate at
the decoder/detector. As long as we use a maximum heuristic
decoder, this is a single figure. In the event of list decoding, it
is more complex as explained in Section 2.2.1.
Distortion is, following [2], measured by the MSEJND as
defined below.
Definition 1 (just notable diﬀerence). Given a signal x =
(x1, . . . , xN ), the just noticeable diﬀerence, JNDi, is the smallest
positive real number, such that x′ = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi ±
JNDi, xi+1, . . . , xN ) is perceptually diﬀerent from x.
In our simulations we have assumed, without loss of
generality, that JNDi = 1 for all i. The general case is achieved
by scaling each sample of the fingerprint signal by factor of
JND−1i before embedding, and rescale before decoding.





[max{0, (|xi − yi| − JNDi)}]2. (10)
It is natural to expect low distortion from the average,
median, and midpoint attacks. The pirate collusion is likely
to include both positive and negative fingerprint signals.
Consequently, these attacks are likely to produce a hybrid
which is closer to the original sample than any of the colluder
fingerprints. On the contrary, the maximum, minimum,
and randomised negative attacks would tend to give a
very distorted hybrid, by using the most distorted version
of each sample. This is experimentally confirmed in [2,
8].
Not surprisingly, the most eﬀective attacks are the most
distorting. The most eﬀective attack according to [8] is the
randomised negative, but the authors raise some doubt that
it be practical due to the distortion.
The performance of existing fingerprinting schemes and
joint WM/FP schemes have been analysed experimentally
or theoretically. Very few systems have been studied both
experimentally and theoretically. In the cases where both
theoretical and experimental analyses exist, there is a huge
discrepancy between the two.
It is not surprising that theoretical analyses are more
pessimistic than experimental ones. An experimental sim-
ulation (e.g., [5]) has to assume one (or a few) specific
attack(s). An adversary who is smarter (or more patient)
than the author and analyst may very well find an attack
which is more eﬀective than any attack analysed. Thus, the
experimental analyses give lower bounds on the error rate
of the decoder, by identifying an attack which achieves the
bound.
The theoretical analyses of the collusion-secure codes
of [4, 9, 10] give mathematical upper bounds on the
error rate under any attack provided that the appropriate
marking assumption holds. Of course, attacks on the WM
layer (which is not considered by those authors) may
very well break the assumptions and thereby the system.
Unfortunately, little work has been done on theoretical
upper bounds for practical fingerprints embedded in real
data.
In any security application, including WM/FP schemes,
the designer has a much harder task than the attacker.
The attacker only needs to find one attack which is good
enough to break the system, and this can be confirmed
experimentally. The designer has to find a system which can
resist every attack, and this is likely to require a complex
argument to be assuring.
This paper will improve the lower bounds (experimental
bounds) for Gaussian spread spectrum fingerprinting, by
identifying more complex nonlinear attacks, which are
more eﬀective than those originally studied. These attacks
are likely to be eﬀective against other joint schemes as
well.
3. THE NOVEL ATTACKS
In this section, we will consider four new classes of
attacks. The minority extreme attack was introduced in a
diﬀerent model in [3], and the uniform attack is intro-
duced in this paper. The last two classes of attacks are
hybrid attacks, behaving as diﬀerent pure attacks either
at random or depending on the collusion signals. We
introduce each attack separately with its rationale and
simulation results. In the next section we will consider noise
attacks.
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Error rates
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Figure 1: Comparing MX against RandNeg. Decoding with
preprocessing gives zero errors throughout.
Distortion















Figure 2: Distortion of pure attacks.
Let wu be the watermark identifying user u, and let r =
z−x be the hybrid watermark generated by the collusion. All
the heuristics we consider include the correlation
hu = r ·w(u) =
N∑
i=1
ri ·w(u)i . (11)
In order to avoid detection, the pirates should attempt
to minimise maxu∈Phu. Without complete knowledge of
the original host x and the watermark signals used, an
accurate minimisation is intractable. However, attempting
to minimise h = avgu∈Phu is a reasonable approximation,
and this can be done by minimising sample by sample,
avgu∈Pri·w(u)i .
All the simulations in this section use sequences of length
n = 10 000 with M = 512 users. The sequences are drawn
from a normal distribution of mean μ = 0 and variance σ2 =
1/9.
With the exception of the code size (i.e., the number of
users), these are the same parameters as used in [2]. There are
two reasons for using larger codes. Firstly, it is hard to come
up with plausible applications for small codes. Secondly, and
more importantly, larger codes give higher error rates which
can be estimated more accurately.
For each simulation, 1000 diﬀerent codes are created,
and one hybrid fingerprint is generated and decoded for
each code. Although this is a smaller sample size than the
2000 tests used in [2], it is appropriate for tuning the attack
parameters. In the next section we will run larger simulations
for a more significant comparison to previous work.
3.1. The minority extreme attack
We introduced the moderated minority extreme (MMX)
attack in [3] in order to break the joint scheme of [5].
Consider the diﬀerence D = zavgi − zmidi . Since zmidi is
an unbiased estimate for the unknown host xi, a positive
D indicates that wi is probably positive. In this case, the
minimum attack is good for the pirates.
If D ≈ 0, we expect that the choice for zi makes little
diﬀerence to the decoding. In this case, we output zi = zi to
minimise the distortion in the hybrid copy.
Definition 3 (moderated minority extreme attack). Let Di =
z
avg
i − zmidi . The MMX attack for a given threshold θ outputs





zmini if Di ≥ θ,
z
avg
i if θ > Di > −θ,
zmaxi if Di ≤ −θ.
(12)
The MMX attack with θ = 0 was called the minority
extreme (MX) attack [3]. Figure 1 shows a simulation of
the MX and RandNeg attack. We observe that the MX
attack causes a slightly higher error rate, confirming that the
criterion that D > 0 is better than a random choice. However,
with preprocessing, the error rate is zero for both attacks. The
average attack was tested as well, but it gave zero errors with
all of the tested decoders. These results are consistent with
those reported in [2].
Figure 2 shows, unfortunately, that the MX attack also
causes about twice the distortion of RandNeg. Given the very
modest increase in error rate, the MX attack is unlikely to be
useful in itself.
3.2. The uniform attack
So far we have seen that the preprocessor of Zhao et al. is very
eﬀective against the attacks considered to date. Somehow we
need to break the preprocessing scheme.
Remember that the preprocessor considers the histogram
and split the samples into two classes around each histogram
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Figure 3: Histogram of a hybrid copies.
peak. An attack which produces a near-flat histogram seems
the natural choice. Our proposal is to draw each hybrid
sample a uniformly at random between the minimum and
maximum observed. This is defined formally as follows.
Definition 4 (the uniform attack). The uniform attack
(“uniatk”) takes t watermarked signals w(u), and produces a
hybrid copy z where each sample zunii is drawn independently
and uniformly at random on the interval [zmini , z
max
i ].
Figure 3 shows example histograms of the MX and
uniform attacks. We can clearly see how the MX attack gives
a histogram resembling that of the RandNeg attack, while the
uniform attack achieves the flatness sought.
Figure 4 shows simulations of the uniform attack com-
pared to the MX attack. The important feature to note is that
the behaviour is very similar for all the decoding options.
The error rate is lower than for the MX decoder without
preprocessor, but for the uniform attack the preprocessor
does not help. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 2, the uniform
Error rates
Number of pirates

















Uniatk; T stat. w/preproc(1)
Uniatk; Z stat. w/preproc(1)
Uniatk; T stat. w/preproc(2)
Uniatk; Z stat. w/preproc(2)
Uniatk; T stat. w/o preproc
Uniatk; Z stat. w/o preproc
Uniatk; q stat. w/preproc(1)
Uniatk; q stat. w/preproc(2)
Uniatk; q stat. w/o preproc
Figure 4: Comparing the uniform attack against MMX and the
classics.
attack causes very little distortion. For large collusions it
seems to have an excellent potential.
3.3. Hybrid attacks
The uniform attack is the bluntest way to produce a flat
histogram, and as we see, it breaks the preprocessing. An
interesting question is if better attacks can be developed
by combining the basic attacks already introduced. We
introduce hybrid attacks as the attack is chosen independently
for each sample according to some probability distribution.
In Figure 5, we have compared hybrid attacks which use
the uniform attack with probability 1 − p, and, respectively,
the MMX or the RandNeg attacks with probability p. As
expected there is a significant diﬀerence between one-peak
and two-peak preprocessing, but the most interesting feature
is that diﬀerent decoding strategies are optimal for diﬀerent
p. The curves cross around p = 0.3. Typical histograms at for
p = 0.3 are shown in Figure 6.
At the expense of increased distortion, these hybrid
attacks allows us to increase the error rates compared to the
pure uniform attack. This is true up to the point, where the
histogram gets a distinctive two-peak shape and Preproc(1)
becomes eﬀective.
3.4. Hybrid attacks with MMX threshold
An alternative to the randomised hybrid attacks just
described is to base the choice on a threshold. This is already
part of the idea in the MMX attack. If the heuristic Di is
close to zero, an average attack is used, and otherwise the MX
attack (minimum or maximum) is used. Obviously, other
combinations are also possible, and we also introduce the
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Error rates for the RandNeg/uniform hybrid attack
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Z stat. w/o preproc
(a) Error rate—RandNeg/uniform
Distortion for the RandNeg/uniform hybrid attack
Probability parameter (p)



















Error rates for the MMX/uniform hybrid attack
Probability parameter (p)


















T stat. w/o preproc
Z stat. w/o preproc
(c) Error rate—MX/uniform
Distortion for the MMX/uniform hybrid attack
Probability parameter (p)

















Figure 5: Comparing hybrid attacks for t = 70 colluders.
MMX-2 attack, where the average is replaced by the uniform
attack.
In Figure 7, we have simulated the MMX with diﬀerent
thresholds. The result is similar to what we saw for the
previous hybrid attacks, but even more pronounced. The
single-peak preprocessor has no significant eﬀect and has
been excluded from the figure. The two-peak preprocessor
is eﬀective for small thresholds. The curves cross around
θ = 0.08.
Typical histograms are shown in Figure 8 at θ = 0.1.
For the MMX-2 attack, we have the same flattish histogram
as before, and no obvious approach preprocessing can be
seen. However, for the regular MMX(-1) attack, we see
a new pattern, with three peaks. It seems plausible that
a preprocessor can be developed to decode correctly in
this scenario, but, unless manual interference is acceptable,
a strict definition of a peak would have to be devel-
oped.
4. THE NOISE ATTACK
He and Wu [5], citing [2], claim that “a number of nonlinear
collusions can be well approximated by an averaging collu-
sion plus additive noise.” We did not find any explicit details
on this claim in either paper, neither on the recommended
noise distribution, nor on which nonlinear attacks can be
so approximated. However, it is an interesting claim to
explore.
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Figure 6: Histogram of hybrid copies from hybrid attacks with p =
0.3.
We consider the following two attacks:
averaging with Gaussian noise: zNGi = zi + αNG,
averaging with Uniform noise: zNUi = zi + αNU ,
(13)
where NG is drawn from a standard normal distribution,
and NU is uniformly distributed on [−1/2, 1/2]. The first
simulation, for t = 70 pirates, is shown in Figure 9. As we
can see, both attacks are eﬀective, but Gaussian noise causes
enormous distortion.
To get a better picture, we plot the noise attacks against
distortion in Figures 10 and 11. We have shown decoding
of the noise attacks without preprocessor only; decoding
with preprocessing is less eﬀective. Supported by Figure 7,
we decode the MMX attack without preprocessor only and
MMX-2 without and with Preproc(1).
Three observations stand out as significant in this
comparison:
(i) attacks with uniform noise are very eﬀective for given
distortion compared to other attacks,
(ii) attacks with Gaussian noise are considerably less
eﬀective than Uniform noise, and inferior to several
other attacks studied,
(iii) for few pirates (t = 35) the distortion/error rate
trade-oﬀ is much steeper for MMX-1 than for the
noise attack, and it outperforms it at high distortion
(150–200).
Now, if a three-peak Zhao et al. type preprocessor is used, the
MMX-1 attack is likely to become ineﬀective.
We conclude that there may be some truth in the claims
that averaging attacks with added noise are the most eﬃcient
attacks known to date. However, two important points have
to be noted in this context. Firstly, the noise should not be
Gaussian. We do not know if Uniform noise is optimal, or
if an even better distribution can be found. Secondly, the
preprocessor of Zhao et al. has to be developed further to
be able to cope, automatically, with all the various attacks we
have studied.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we report additional simulations of the
attacks which have proved most eﬀective so far, to see how
they compare under diﬀerent conditions, that is, varying t,
M, and n.
We have not include simulations with real images,
because all the processes studied are oblivious to any added
host signal. The detector is nonblind so any host added
would be subtracted before detection. Also the attacks would
be unaﬀected by the added host signal. Hence, simulations
with real hosts would not give us any additional information.
The constants, namely, the power of the fingerprint and
the value of the Just Noticeable Diﬀerence would be scaled
by the same factor according to perceptibility constraints in
the same image. As stated, we have used the values suggested
in [2], and a further study of these parameters is outside the
scope of this paper.
None of the attacks discussed in Section 2.3, nor the
MX attack, are eﬀective against the preprocessor. Hence, the
interesting attacks for further study are the hybrid attacks,
the MMX attack with nonzero threshold, and the Uniform
noise attack. The Uniform attack is a special case of the
hybrid attack.
5.1. The Zhao et al. parameters
In this section, following [2], we assume M = 100 users.
We have used Uniform noise with scaling factor 2.2, and
Gaussian noise with power 0.47. The MMX-1 attack is with
θ = 0.05, and MMX-2 with θ = 0.08. The hybrid attacks are
with p = 0.25.
The results, shown in Figures 12 and 13, confirm what
we have seen before. There is little diﬀerence between the
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Error rates for the MMX attack
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(a) Error rate (35 pirates)
Distortion for the MMX
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(b) Distortion (35 pirates)
Error rates for the MMX attack
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(c) Error rate (70 pirates)
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(d) Distortion (70 pirates)
Figure 7: The MMX attack with diﬀerent thresholds.
diﬀerent decoders, and the best attacks achieve error rates
pe ≈ 6% against the best decoder. It seems that the param-
eters of [2] suﬃce to ensure reasonable robustness against
known nondesynchronising attacks. However, we have also
confirmed that with our novel attacks, properly tuned, the
preprocessing algorithm does not improve detection.
It is also confirmed that averaging with uniform noise
is among the most eﬃcient attacks. It is not feasible to run
enough simulations to determine the optimal noise power or
MMX thresholds for every number t of pirates. Thus, this
simulation is insuﬃcient to determine if one attack is strictly
better under any given conditions.
The choice of decoding heuristic seems to matter very
little, although the q statistic is consistently outperformed.
No clear distinction can be made between the Z and T
statistics. In Figure 13 we show only Z decoding.
5.2. List decoding
Since list decoding is more popular than maximum heuristic
decoding in the fingerprinting literature, we will have a brief
look at this as well, for comparison.
We have seen that the Uniform noise attack (scale 2.2)
gives an error rate of about 5% with t = 70 colluders using
maximum heuristic decoding (3% at t = 35). The resulting
MSDJND distortion (not normalised) is about 100–150. This
is slightly less distortion than the RandNeg attack at t =
70 and slightly more at t = 35. Simulations are shown in
Figure 14.
The experiment is conducted as follows. We generate a
set G of t “guilty” codewords and a set I of 100 − t “inno-
cent” codewords. The average of the “guilty” codewords is
calculated and noise added, to give the received fingerprint r.
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Figure 8: Histogram of a hybrid copies with MMX attacks at
threshold θ = 0.1.
The Z statistic Z(u) is calculated for every user u ∈ G ∪
I. This experiment is repeated 2000 times, and for each
iteration j we keep the following data:
Gj =
{
Z(u) : u ∈ G}, I j = {Z(u) : u ∈ I},
gj = max
u∈G




We estimate the expected number of false positives E(PF) and


















We have plotted Ê(PF) against Ê(PT) for varying threshold τ
in Figure 14 (left-hand side).
Error rates for averaging attack with noise
Scaling factor























Distortion for averaging with noise
Scaling factor
















Figure 9: The averaging with noise attack by 70 pirates with
diﬀerent thresholds.
The probability pc of at least one correct output and the
probability p f of at least one false negative are estimated as
p̂c = #{ j | i j ≥ τ}, p̂ f = #{ j | gj ≥ τ}. (16)
Figure 14 (right-hand side) shows p̂c plotted against p̂ f for
varying thresholds.
As we can see, the diﬀerent attacks have similar perfor-
mances. We observe that with t = 70 and p f = 5%, we
get only pc ≈ 80%, even in the best case for the decoder.
The noise attack gives pc ≈ 70%. For t = 35 colluders and
p f = 3% we have pc ≈ 80% against the noise attack. It
follows that the total error rate in the list decoding scenario
is considerably worse than it is with maximum heuristic
decoding.
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Figure 10: Noise versus the MMX attacks.
If we require p f ≤ 1% as assumed in [2], the detection
rate for the noise attack at t = 70 is little more than 20%, and
at t = 35 it is about 50%.
5.3. Scalability
So far we have considered very small codes, which
are unlikely to be of practical use. One real appli-
cation of fingerprinting is for the issue of screening
copies for the academy awards (“Oscar”). (See, e.g.,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4037016.) In this scenario
the number of users is in the order of 5000. It is hard
to come up with real applications with fewer users, so we
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Figure 11: Noise versus hybrid attacks.
run one set of simulations for M = 5000. We assumed an
averaging attack with uniform additive noise on the interval
[−1.1, 1.1].
In coding theory and communications, it is normally
expected that a well-designed code can scale freely keep-
ing the rate R = (logM)/n constant. With M =
5000 users and the rate of the (10 000, 100) code, we
get n = 18 500. The result was an error rate of
71.2%, so evidently Gaussian fingerprinting does not scale
well.
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Figure 12: Large simulation with M = 100 users and 25 000 tests.
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Figure 13: Large simulation with M = 100 users and 25 000 tests, with Z statistic decoding only.
Table 2: Error rates after the Uniform noise attack with t = 70
pirates, for various sequence lengths n and numbers M of users.
Simulation based on 1000 samples.
(n,M) R Pe
(10000, 100) 6.64 · 10−4 6.6
(18500, 5000) 6.64 · 10−4 71.2
(23500, 3000) 4.92 · 10−4 52.1
(21500, 1500) 4.91 · 10−4 44.7
(19500, 750) 4.90 · 10−4 27.2
(20000, 200) 3.82 · 10−4 7.9
(25000, 500) 3.59 · 10−4 16.5
(50000, 2000) 2.19 · 10−4 11.6
(50000, 1000) 1.99 · 10−4 6.4
(50000, 500) 1.79 · 10−4 3.2
A larger range of code parameters are shown in Table 2.
Admittedly, a small sample has been used, to get results in
reasonable time, but the tendency is clear and consistent.
Keeping constant rate, the error rate increases dramatically
when the code size increases.
Codebooks of nM ≈ 108 is close to the limits of
what we can simulate with our current crude Matlab
implementation on a 32-bit system. Codebook storage
may very well be the limiting factor also for practical
applications, even though somewhat larger codebooks could
be made possible by a more eﬃcient implementation. The
largest codebooks that we have tried would use 400 Mb
at single precision. Significantly larger codebooks would
probably have to be generated on the fly by a pseudoran-
dom number generator, so that only the seed has to be
stored.
6. CONCLUSION
We have performed an extensive experimental analysis of
collusive and noise attacks on Gaussian spread-spectrum
fingerprinting, and introduced a couple of novel attacks.
Below, we will itemise what we consider the main out-
comes of our study, as well as the key questions left
open.
6.1. Observations made
(i) The MX attack introduced in [3] is eﬀective against
common decoders with Z, T , or q statistics. However,
it is not eﬀective against the preprocessor of Zhao
et al.
(ii) The parameters suggested by Zhao et al. appear to
give a fairly robust system against known (nondesyn-
chronising) attacks.
(iii) The uniform attack, as well as hybrid attacks based
thereon, break the Zhao et al. preprocessor.
(iv) Averaging combined with Gaussian noise is not an
eﬀective attack compared with the other attacks
studied.
(v) Averaging combined with Uniform noise is very
eﬀective. It seems to outperform the other attacks
considered under most, if not all, conditions.
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Uniform Noise (0) [25]
(a) t = 35 returned user

























Uniform Noise (0) [25]
(b) t = 35 error event
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Uniform Noise (0) [26]
(c) t = 70 returned user

























Uniform Noise (0) [26]
(d) t = 70 error event
Figure 14: List decoding performance. The left-hand figures show the probability of at least one true positive against the false positive rate.
The right-hand figures show the average number of true and false positives for diﬀerent thresholds.
(vi) Gaussian fingerprinting does not scale well from an
information theoretic perspective.
Based on these observations, we conclude that the analysis
of new fingerprinting schemes requires attention to a wider
range of possible attacks than those considered in the
literature. We have introduced a number of attacks worth
mentioning, but we do not claim to have found them all.
6.2. Questions left open
The most interesting question left open by this study is a
theoretical analysis of the attacks presented. This is expected
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to be slightly harder than the analysis of previous attacks [2],
leading to more complicated formulae.
From an applied viewpoint, a more important question
is how a complete fingerprint system can be designed.
Very little research exists on watermarking robust against
desynchronising attacks, and nobody has yet considered a
combination of collusion attacks and desynchronisation. In
a real scenario, the attackers will have such attacks at their
disposal in addition to what we have studied.
In our analysis we have been assuming that the correct
preprocessor mode can be easily determined, and we also
supposed that it can be extended for a three-peak histogram.
At present this is, at best, true using manual inspection. Fur-
ther research is needed to implement automatic histogram
analysis and application of the optimal preprocessor. It is also
an open question if suﬃcient information is available from
the histogram.
Another open direction in research is the application
of collusion-secure codes (e.g., [4, 6, 9]) in a practical
watermark/fingerprint system. Since Gaussian fingerprints
do not scale well, they may have to be combined with an
outer, q-ary, collusion-secure code. In this case, q Gaussian
sequences would be used to represent the q-ary symbols of
the outer codewords.
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